OF NATURE. 619 



speculations or as the beginning, not of things them- 

 selves, but of our logical and scientific reasoning about 

 them. The Discontinuous, on the other side, presents 

 itself when, adopting a certain definite collocation which, 

 it must not be forgotten, contains the feature of con- 

 tingency, we attempt to explain how from this initial 

 state, which we have observed or assumed, the further 

 historical developments can be mechanically deduced. 

 And here it may again be noted that, if we include 

 already in our initial collocation the elements of life and 

 mind as some so-called Monists, like Haeckel, do, we 

 have nevertheless to explain the continual growth of 

 mental values, so clearly pointed out by Wundt, and the 

 unforeseen and erratic creations, inventions, and dis- 

 coveries of genius. 



These two problems of the Contingent and the Dis- si. 



The prob- 



continuous remain, at the end of the nineteenth century, lemsofthe 



* ' Contingent 



the two principal outstanding problems in which the Discontmu- 

 great problem of nature specifies itself. The philosophy standing. 

 of Lotze, in the sesthetical and ethical aspects which it 

 contains, points to a solution of these difficulties. As 

 this, however, leads us away from the present subject, I 

 shall take it up in later chapters. 



The ideas of Lotze, which, as I have shown, reach 

 back to the speculations of Schelling, have not been 

 adequately appreciated and followed up in subsequent 

 German philosophy. This has moved mainly on other 

 lines. At the moment, however, it seems, as I have 

 already stated above, as if Lotze's views are creating a 

 renewed and deeper interest. 



It is to French thought within the last thirty years 



