OF NATURE. 623 



tween phenomena which stand ostensibly apart i.e., by 

 the study of the continuous. This attempt, he found, 

 could not be consistently and satisfactorily carried 

 through. It seems, as he himself tells us, that this 

 change in his opinions was brought about by a study 

 of the writings of Descartes and the Critiques of Kant. 

 In fact, he professes to continue and correct the work of 

 the latter which he considers to be fundamental. His 

 philosophy was therefore known, for a long time, as 

 JSTeocriticism, and retained this title till, in his more 

 recent constructive works, he dwelt on the positive idea 

 of personality as the ultimate conception we could 

 reach in philosophy. 



Since that time his system is known under the name 

 of " Personnalisme." From this we see that his reason- 

 ing dwells more upon the ethical outcome of philosophy 

 than upon the sesthetical, which is characteristic of the 

 school of Lachelier. Kenouvier was evidently much im- 

 pressed by the ultimate contradictions or " Antinomies " 

 to which we are logically led by following out the lines 

 of thought suggested to us by experience and observa- 

 tion. He sees in this part of Kant's criticism the 

 most important contribution which he has made to 

 modern thought. But he does not agree with the 

 manner in which Kant tried to solve his antinomies. 

 He does not believe in the contrast of the phenomenal 

 and noumenal worlds, nor of the empirical and tran- 

 scendental (intelligible). For Eenouvier there is only 

 one world, the world of phenomena ; he is so far a pure 

 empiricist or phenomenist. But the contradictions in 



