OF THE GOOD. 205 



of Schleiermacher, I shall have to say more in the 

 sequel. 



Of philosophers who stood upon independent or, as 

 it is frequently termed, purely scientific ground, there 

 are before the middle of the century only two or at 

 most three names to be mentioned who seriously 

 and systematically attacked the problems of moral 

 philosophy ; these were Fries, Beneke, but more than 

 any other, Herbart. We need not linger over Fries, 

 although he formed to a certain extent a school of 

 his own, nor over Beneke, though he was the first 

 who possessed and introduced an adequate knowledge 

 of the labours of English psychologists and moral 

 philosophers. His writings had little influence at the 

 time and received due appreciation much later. Herbart 46. 



Herbart 



is a much more important name in what we may term 

 the reform of ethical philosophy in Germany. He had 

 the merit of introducing into German philosophical 

 thought a line of reasoning which was not unfamiliar 

 to some of the moralists in this country, but for which 

 he was the first to coin a distinctive term, through 

 which this special way of attacking the moral problem 

 has found currency in recent ethical treatises, not only 

 in Germany, but also in England and other countries. 

 He maintained that ethics had to deal with judgments 

 of value, not with judgments of fact. In doing this, 

 he perpetuated, though in a different form, the dualism 

 which existed already in Kant's philosophy between 

 theoretical and practical reason. He separated ethics 

 completely from metaphysics, and opposed all attempts, 

 suggested by Kant himself, and still more by his 



