314 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



realisation of the moral ideal, so far as it is revealed to, 

 and can be grasped by, the human mind, can dispense 

 with all further philosophical definitions of the " highest 

 good " ; and this was eminently the case in Schleier- 

 macher's theology. His efforts were therefore latterly 

 more directed towards the systematic statement of the 

 main points of Christian faith and Christian duty, than 

 to an independent deduction of purely philosophical 

 principles. 1 In fact, we cannot understand Schleier- 



1 Before we leave Schleiermacher 

 the philosopher and speak of him as 

 theologian, in which aspect he was 

 indeed for a long time exclusively 

 considered by philosophical writers, 

 it is well to note that his earlier 

 speculations, in particular the 

 'Addresses' (1799) and the ' Mono- 

 logues' (1801), contain really the 

 beginnings of a much deeper psych- 

 ology than Kant, Fichte, or Schel- 

 ling possessed. In fact, if we adopt 

 the conceptions and the terminology 

 established by the recent notably 

 the English introspective school 

 of psychology, we are able to put 

 in a much clearer light Schleier- 

 macher's religious and ethical ideas, 

 and to show how they mark a really 

 great advance upon those of con- 

 temporary thinkers, foreshadowing 

 what has only quite recently been 

 more clearly brought out. This is 

 to a large extent implied in Dilthey 's 

 book. It forms the introductory 

 conception in Bender's ' Exposi- 

 tion" (loc. cit., p. 6), and still 

 more in Fuchs' study of Schleier- 

 macher, in which he contrasts his 

 empirical psychology, his intro- 

 spective method, which does not 

 sacrifice its observations to a 

 unique principle, with Fichte in 

 his contemporary writings, though 

 it must be admitted that the latter, 

 later on in his career, recognised 

 the necessity of a deeper and 



broader psychology. This is very 

 marked in the posthumously pub- 

 lished Lectures on 'The Data of 

 Consciousness.' There are, to men- 

 tion only a few points, two recent 

 ideas which are implicitly contained 

 in Schleiermacher's earliest specu- 

 lations, as they have been published 

 by Dilthey in the invaluable appen- 

 dix to his ' Life of Schleiermacher. ' 

 To these, as well as to the ' Mono- 

 logues,' both fragmentary produc- 

 tions, full of remarkable glimpses 

 into the recesses of the human mind, 

 Fuchs has largely resorted as form- 

 ing, together with the ' Addresses,' 

 the material for his study of the 

 development of Schleiermacher's 

 mind. In the first Schleiermacher 

 takes what I have repeatedly 

 termed the "Synoptic" view.relying 

 not only upon Sight (Anschauung), 

 i.e., direct inner experience, but 

 putting it emphatically also that 

 this must be always comprehensive, 

 grasping a whole, and not single 

 parts of the object in view. The 

 second point is that we cannot 

 read Schleiermacher's observations 

 without seeing clearly that the 

 difficulties in the speculations of 

 that age can be traced mainly to 

 two points : the unfortunate 

 " Thing in itself " of Kant and the 

 ambiguity which attaches to the 

 conception of Self under whatever 

 term Consciousness, Ego, &c. 



