324 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



desire them to be harmonised in some philosophical 



theory which explains their mutual relation and inter- 



32 - dependence. In this respect Ritschl also leaves us in 



Gap in his 



>tz7 : tbe dark, but his appreciation of Lotze's philosophy 

 reminds us that it is there that we may hope to find an 

 indication how to deal with this problem. I have had 

 repeated occasion to refer to the manner in which Lotze 

 defines and presents the whole philosophical problem. 



But in referring to Albrecht Eitschl and his relation 

 to Lotze's views I am somewhat anticipating the course 

 of religious speculation in Germany. This was for a 

 long time, before Ritschl's larger works appeared and 

 before Lotze's views became more generally known and 

 accessible, occupied with a criticism of what Kant, 

 Hegel, and Schleiermacher had done towards a definition 

 and solution of the problem of the Spirit. Let us 

 33. recall the fact that Kant had given an essentially 



Different , 



treatment ethical conception of religion, that Hegel s was an 



by Kant, 



scwe\er. essentially metaphysical and Schleiermacher's an essen- 

 macher - tially psychological interpretation ; the two latter philo- 

 sophers having, though from entirely different points 

 of view, taken in also the historical aspect which was 

 neglected by Kant. These three distinct treatments of 

 the religious problem exhibit interesting contrasts as 

 well as coincidences. To begin with, both Hegel and 

 Schleiermacher opposed the dualism inherent in Kant's 

 system, but, in doing so, did not arrive at such an 

 emphatic definition of good and evil and of the fact of 

 moral obligation as Kant had done. On the other side, 

 both Kant and Schleiermacher treated religion more as 

 a psychological or anthropological phenomenon, denying 



