344 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



and contemporary, G. T. Fechner. 1 The peculiarity of 

 Lotze's system is, first of all, his elaborate demonstra- 

 tion that even the mechanical connection of things in 

 time and space what the human mind calls the rela- 

 tions of things or the laws of nature cannot be grasped 

 in human thought otherwise than by assuming an under- 

 lying unity of existence called by him the universal 

 substance. Of this we have an immediate knowledge 

 only in the experience of the unity of our own thought 

 and consciousness. 



But Lotze goes a step further, though he never arrived 

 at a systematic elaboration of this portion of his system, 

 but rather postulated its results in the form of an under- 

 lying conviction which prompted and sustained the whole 

 of his reasoning. This consists in defining the essence 



mon to these is to search for the 

 elemental facts and build up com- 

 plex phenomena by a plausible and 

 intelligible synthesis of these. The 

 time had not yet arrived when the 

 truth, fully seen by Lotze, was to be- 

 come more generally accepted, that 

 no complex phenomenon can be re- 

 constructed and thoroughly under- 

 stood by such a process. The original 

 synoptical whole, if once dissected 

 into its elements, cannot again be 

 regained by synthesis : either 

 through complexity or through a 

 loss of the uniting bond, the true 

 reality, the actual life is lost. But 

 we have in recent times, as ex- 

 plained more fully in the text, more 

 and more learnt that this remark 

 does not refer only to such stupen- 

 dous events as the appearance, 

 origin, and history of the Christian 

 religion, but that it applies also to 

 occurrences which happen daily 

 under our very eyes, such notably 

 as the phenomena of life, conscious- 

 ness and freewill, which have not 



infrequently been termed miracles, 

 and which, if we attempt to dissect 

 and explain them scientifically, 

 present to us something seemingly 

 incommensurable or irrational. The 

 foremost representative of this view 

 among thinkers seems to me to be 

 the late Prof. Wilhelm Dilthey, in 

 whose speculation rlebniss (living 

 experience) forms a central con- 

 ception. 



1 See on this subject the very 

 interesting Review by Lotze 

 ('Kleine Schriften,' vol. iii. p. 

 396-437). It refers to Strauss' 

 ' Der alte und der neue Glaube ' 

 (1872), and Fechner's 'Die Tages- 

 ansicht gegeniiber der Nachtan- 

 sicht ' (1879). Lotze expresses him- 

 self as unable to accept the " new 

 creed " of Strauss, and deplores that 

 the latter had met the over hasty 

 conclusions of naturalists with a 

 readiness of belief which he other- 

 wise " denied to everything which 

 did not justify itself to his own sub- 

 jective understanding." 



