OF SOCIETY. 457 



published as 'The Wealth of Nations' in 1776. 

 Through this combination of several subjects in his 

 full Course he was obliged to place them in definite 

 relations, and although his publications cover only one 

 half of his whole Course, we have in Adam Smith the 

 first instance of a clearly recognised distinction of the 

 principles which should respectively form the basis of 

 ethics and political economy. 



Ethics is based by him upon a sentiment, that of so. 



Contrast 



sympathy. This is put forward at the beginning of ^ et ^ e ?" , 



* A. Smith s 



his ' Theory of Moral Sentiments ' as a psychological JJjJJj^t 

 trait of human nature. On the other side his economic 

 speculations are based upon a similarly distinct enun- 

 ciation of the psychological principle expressed in the 

 statement that there is a special instinct in human as 

 distinguished from other living beings ; which is prob- 

 ably developed by reason and speech. This is the 

 propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing 

 for another. No animal does this. 



It is not correct either to identify the moral principle 

 of Adam Smith, the sentiment of sympathy, with what 

 Auguste Comte later on termed altruism, or to term the 

 'other simply egotism. Nevertheless, the view taken by 

 Adam Smith draws attention to a dual interest which 

 governs human conduct and action. But Adam Smith 31. 



Social 



does not represent his two psychological principles or harmony 



sought in 



instincts as entering into a kind of contest, but inter- 

 poses between them, as a regulative and higher principle, 

 the principle of justice. 1 



1 The fact that Adam Smith, 

 as well as several contemporary 

 thinkers in this country such as 

 Adam Ferguson, took a broad we 



may say an anthropological view 

 of the problem of human society, 

 was, till quite recently, overlooked 

 by historians of philosophy ; the 



