488 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



pathetic as well as of selfish emotion, and he notes 

 that in human history the former, for which he has 

 coined the word Altruism, gradually gains the upper 

 hand over the latter, i.e., over Egoism. But he does 

 not enter on any psychological or critical analysis of 

 this remarkable compound of human nature, but takes 

 for granted that what he considers to be an observed 

 fact in human history, the growth of the altruistic feel- 

 ings, is an indication of what ought to be, or rather of 

 what will be. 1 Consistent with his early announcement 

 that all practical policy including, of course, his later 

 spiritual cult can only consist in furthering and facili- 

 tating tendencies in human nature which have been 

 historically discovered, he elevates the ethical principle 

 of altruism into the position of a supreme moral precept 

 or command : " live for others." He thus introduces 

 into the religion of humanity the great central idea of 



1 Mill in his criticism of Comte's 

 scheme of reorganisation, notices 

 a, break in the continuity of 

 Comte's ideas, inasmuch as the 

 "comprehensive view of the pro- 

 gress of human society in the 

 past," is not used as a "basis of 

 practical recommendations " for the 

 future. "... \ve fail to see any 

 scientific connection between his 

 theoretical explanation of the past 

 progress of society and his pro- 

 posals for future improvement " 

 ('Auguste Comte and Positivism, 1 

 2nd ed., 1866, p. 118). It is how- 

 ever possible in the light of the 

 more recent developments of Posi- 

 tivism to look upon this break of 

 continuity in Comte's speculation 

 in a more favourable way. Comte 

 saw clearly that ever so complete 

 a knowledge of what is and has 



been, and ever so clear a foresight 

 of the future (if such were pos- 

 sible), does not bring with it au 

 obligation to promote or expedite 

 by personal effort this natural 

 process. It was the object of 

 the later labours of Comte to 

 emphasise the feeling of duty and 

 obligation and to establish sanctions 

 and a supreme authority. An 

 exclusive acceptance of the earlier 

 teaching of Comte such as Littre 

 represents necessarily" implies an 

 extinction of the sense of moral 

 obligation. Co-operation could be 

 recommended merely as a means 

 of more efficiently and more 

 rapidly gaining the mastery over 

 the natural forces, which is an 

 important but not the highest aim 

 of human progress. (See on this 

 also supra, p. 485.) 



