OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 687 



world, of Humanity. Thus he finds a highest construc- 

 tive principle, and, with this in mind, he undertakes 

 to rewrite the whole of his philosophy, beginning with 

 the social idea. 



This again reminds us of a similar twofold develop- 5s. 



. . , Parallel 



ment in Hegel's writings. The ' Philosophic Positive between 



Comte and 



corresponds to Hegel's ' Phenomenology.' Both lead up He s el - 

 to a highest idea, which is already foreshadowed in the 

 beginning of the respective "Works. The ' Politique 

 Positive ' corresponds to Hegel's system as given in the 

 ' Logic ' and the ' Encyclopaedia.' We are also reminded 

 that Kant intended in a similar way to duplicate the 

 exposition of his doctrine. 



In the later work Comte further recognises the 

 necessity of dealing not only with the social principle, 

 but also with its bearing on the life and conduct 

 of the individual. Upon the foundation of sociology 

 there must be built up a scheme of morality. In 

 that work also Comte recognises, though he does not 

 use the conventional language, the two main ethical 

 problems : the question as to the essence of morality, 

 and the question of obligation. The former is emphati- 

 cally the altruistic principle, the living for others. As 

 to the second, on the question how obligation is to be 

 harmonised with the freedom of the individual, we are 

 left in uncertainty. It seems that Comte was so 

 impressed with the priority of the social order over 

 individual interests, that he trusted to the existence 

 of this order, to the influence of the emotions, and the 

 effect of education, to insure its general recognition. 



The later or systematic part of Comte's philosophy is 



