22 FKAGMENTS OF SCIENCE. 



marvel. . . What ground of reason can we assign for an 

 expectation that any part of the course of nature will be the 

 next moment what it has been up to this moment, i.e. for our 

 belief in the uniformity of nature ? None. No demonstra- 

 tive reason can be given, for the contrary to the recurrence 

 of a fact of nature is no contradiction. No probable reason 

 can be given; for all probable reasoning respecting the 

 course of nature is founded upon this presumption of like- 

 ness, and therefore cannot be the foundation of it. No rea- 

 son can be given for this belief. It is without a reason. 

 It rests upon no rational grounds, and can be traced to no 

 rational principle.' 



' Everything,' Mr. Mozley, however, adds, ' depends 

 upon this belief, every provision we make for the future, 

 every safeguard and caution we employ against it, all 

 calculation, all adjustment of means to ends, supposes 

 this belief ; and yet this belief has no more producible 



reason for it than a speculation of fancy It is 



necessary, all-important for the purposes of life, but 

 solely practical, and possesses no intellectual character. 

 .... The proper function,' continues Mr. Mozley, ' of 

 the inductive principle, the argument from experience, 

 the belief in the order of nature by whatever phrase we 

 designate the same instinct is to operate as a practical 

 basis for the affairs of life and the carrying on of human 

 society.' To sum up, the belief in the order of nature 

 is general, but it is 4 an unintelligent impulse, of which 

 we can give no rational account.' It is inserted into 

 our constitution solely to induce us to till our fields, to 

 raise our winter fuel, and thus to meet the future on 

 the perfectly gratuitous supposition that it will be like 

 the past. 



4 Thus, step by step,' says Mr. Mozley, with the em- 

 phasis of a man who feels his position to be a strong one, 

 'has philosophy loosened the connection of the order of 



