SCIENCE AND MAN. 363 



not masters of the circumstances in which motives and 

 wishes originate; if, finally, our motives and wishes 

 determine our actions in what sense can these actions 

 be said to be the result of free-will? 



Here, again, we are confronted with the question of 

 moral responsibility, which, as it has been much talked 

 of lately, it is desirable to meet. With the view of 

 removing the fear of our falling back into the condition 

 of ' the ape and tiger,' so sedulously excited by certain 

 writers, I propose to grapple with this question in its 

 rudest form, and in the most uncompromising way. 



* If,' says the robber, the ravisher, or the murderer, * I 

 act because I must act, what right have you to hold 

 me responsible for my deeds?' The reply is, 'The 

 right of society to protect itself against aggressive and 

 injurious forces, whether they be bond or free, forces of 

 nature or forces of man.' * Then,' retorts the criminal, 



* you punish me for what I cannot help.' ' Let it be 

 granted,' says society, 'but had you known that the 

 treadmill or the gallows was certainly in store for you, you 

 might have " helped." Let us reason the matter fully 

 and frankly out. We may entertain no malice or hatred 

 against you ; it is enough that with a view to our own 

 safety and purification we are determined that you and 

 such as you shall not enjoy liberty of evil action in our 

 midst. You, who have behaved as a wild beast, we 

 claim the right to cage or kill as we should a wild beast. 

 The public safety is a matter of more importance than 

 the very limited chance of your moral renovation, while 

 the knowledge that you have been hanged by the neck 

 may furnish to others about to do as you have done the 

 precise motive which will hold them back. If your act 

 be such as to invoke a minor penalty, then not only 

 others, but yourself, may profit bj the punishment 



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