PEOFESSOE VIECHOW AND EVOLUTION. 407 



sciousness enter as links into the chain of antecedence 

 and sequence, which gives rise to bodily actions ? Speak- 

 ing for myself, it is certain that I have no power of 

 imagining such states interposed between the molecules 

 of the brain, and influencing the transference of motion 

 among the molecules. The thing " eludes all mental 

 presentation." Hence an iron strength seems to belong 

 to the logic which claims for the brain an automatic 

 action uninfluenced by consciousness. But it is, I 

 believe, admitted by those who hold the automaton 

 theory, that states of consciousness are produced by the 

 motion of the molecules of the brain ; and this produc- 

 tion of consciousness by molecular motion is to me quite 

 as unpresentable to the mental vision as the production of 

 molecular motion by consciousness. If I reject one result 

 I must reject both. /, however, reject neither, and 

 thus stand in the presence of two Incomprehensibles, 

 instead of one Incomprehensible.' Here I secede from 

 the automaton theory, though maintained by friends 

 who have all my esteem, and fall back upon the avowal 

 which occurs with such wearisome iteration through- 

 out the foregoing pages ; namely, my own utter in- 

 capacity to grasp the problem. 



This avowal is repeated with emphasis in the 

 passage to which Professor Virchow's translator draws 

 attention. What, I there ask, is the causal connection 

 between the objective and the subjective between 

 molecular motions and states of consciousness? My 

 answer is : I do not see the connection, nor am I 

 acquainted with anybody who does. It is no explana- 

 tion to say that the objective and subjective are two sides 

 of one and the same phenomenon. Why should the 

 phenomenon have two sides ? This is the, very core of 

 the difficulty. There are plenty of molecular motions 

 which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water 



