ON THE ABEYANCE OF MEMORY. 151 



so on ad infinitum; so that, ex hypothesi, the germ must 

 become instinct with all these memories, epitomised as 

 after long time, and unperceived though they may well 

 be, not to say obliterated in part or entirely so far as 

 many features are concerned, by more recent impres- 

 sions. In this case, we must conceive of the impreg- 

 nate germ as of a creature which has to repeat a per- 

 formance already repeated before on countless different 

 occasions, but with no more variation on the more 

 recent ones than is inevitable in the repetition of any 

 performance by an intelligent being. 



Now if we take the most parallel case to this which 

 we can find, and consider what we should ourselves do 

 under such circumstances, that is to say, if we consider 

 what course is actually taken by beings who are in- 

 fluenced by what we all call memory, when they repeat 

 an already often-repeated performance, and if we find 

 a very strong analogy between the course so taken by 

 ourselves, and that which from whatever cause we 

 observe to be taken by a living germ, we shall surely 

 be much inclined to think that there must be a simi- 

 larity in the causes of action in each case ; and hence, 

 to conclude, that the action of the germ is due to 

 memory. 



It will, therefore, be necessary to consider the general 

 tendency of our minds in regard to impressions made 

 upon us, and the memory of such impressions. 



Deep impressions upon the memory are made in 

 two ways, differing rather in degree than kind, but 

 with two somewhat widely different results. They 

 are made : 

 L 



