INST/NCT AS INHERITED MEMORY. 215 



innate by all modern schools of philosophy, which agree 

 to reject the theory of the tabula, rasa" (if there is no 

 tabula rasa, there is continued psychological personality, 

 or words have lost their meaning), " and to accept either 

 latent ideas, or ct> priori forms of thought " (surely only a 

 periphrasis for continued personality and memory) " or 

 pre- ordination of the nervous system and of the organ- 

 ism ; it will "be seen that this character of innateness does 

 not constitute an absolute distinction between instinct and 

 intelligence. 



" It is true that intelligence is variable, but so also is 

 instinct, as we have seen. In winter, the Ehine beaver 

 plasters his wall to windward ; once he was a builder, 

 now a burrower ; once he lived in society, now he is 

 solitary. Intelligence itself can scarcely be more vari- 

 able. . . . Instinct may be modified, lost, reawakened. 



" Although intelligence is, as a rule, conscious, it may 

 also become unconscious and automatic, without losing 

 its identity. Neither is instinct always so blind, so 

 mechanical, as is supposed, for at times it is at fault. 

 The wasp that has faultily trimmed a leaf of its paper 

 begins again. The bee only gives the hexagonal form 

 to its cell after many attempts and alterations. It is 

 difficult to believe that the loftier instincts" (and 

 surely, then, the more recent instincts) " of the higher 

 animals are not accompanied by at least a confused con- 

 sciousness. There is, therefore, no absolute distinction 

 between instinct and intelligence ; there is not a single 

 characteristic which, seriously considered, remains the 

 exclusive property of either. The contrast established 

 between instinctive acts and intellectual acts is, never- 



