THE ARBITER OF ETHICS 227 



us to cross those boundaries which properly limit sci- 

 ence. 



As for false hypotheses, it would seem to be self- 

 evident that they should be abandoned as soon as a 

 postulate or conclusion was shown to be wrong. It is 

 just as important to discard error in science as it is in 

 anything else. And it is besides an added and con- 

 fusing burden to the student to keep these false hypoth- 

 eses in treatises on science; they should be relegated to 

 histories of criticism whose chief purpose is to show the 

 progress of science in its devious path toward the 

 truth. 



Unfortunately, most hypotheses cannot be readily 

 classed as either true or false since they involve pos- 

 tulates which can neither be denied nor affirmed from 

 scientific criteria; thus in themselves they are fitly 

 classed as indifferent. Yet they may indirectly either 

 benefit or obstruct the progress of science. So long 

 as we keep clearly in our minds and in our statements 

 the fact that such problems as a nebular hypothesis, the 

 condition of prehistoric life, radiation in interstellar 

 space, the ultimate constitution of matter, etc., are 

 pure speculations, I do not suppose any serious harm 

 is done. But the hypotheses which we have created 

 with respect to atoms, the ether, natural selection, 

 mutations, and the like, have a much more subtile in- 

 fluence, and they have been used in such a fashion as 

 to confuse knowledge. 



