INTRODUCTION xiii 



complementary to the understanding, powers of which 

 we have only an indistinct feeling when we remain shut up 

 in ourselves, but which will become clear and distinct 

 when they perceive themselves at work, so to speak, in the 

 evolution of nature. They will thus learn what sort of 

 effort they must make to be intensified and expanded in 

 the very direction of life. 



This amounts to saying that theory of knowledge and 

 theory of life seem to us inseparable. A theory of life that 

 is not accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is obliged 

 to accept, as they stand, the concepts which the under- 

 standing puts at its disposal: it can but enclose the facts, 

 willing or not, in pre-existing frames which it regards as 

 ultimate. It thus obtains a symbolism which is convenient, 

 perhaps even necessary to positive science, but not a direct 

 vision of its object. On the other hand, a theory of knowl- 

 edge which does not replace the intellect in the general 

 evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of 

 knowledge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge 

 or go beyond them. It is necessary that these two in- 

 quiries, theory of knowledge and theory of life, should 

 join each other, and, by a circular process, push each other 

 on unceasingly. 



Together, they may solve by a method more sure, brought 

 nearer to experience, the great problems that philosophy 

 poses. For, if they should succeed in their common en- 

 terprise, they would show us the formation of the intellect, 

 and thereby the genesis of that matter of which our in- 

 tellect traces the general configuration. They would 

 dig to the very root of nature and of mind. They would 

 substitute for the false evolutionism of Spencer — which 

 consists in cutting up present reality, already evolved, 

 into little bits no less evolved, and then recomposing it 



