50 CREATIVE EVOLUTION iohap. 



there we do not even take all we find, for of the intellect 

 we keep only one or two of the concepts by which it ex- 

 presses itself; and it is this part of a part that we declare 

 representative of the whole, of something indeed which 

 goes beyond the concrete whole, I mean of the evolution 

 movement of which this "whole" is only the present stage! 

 The truth is, that to represent this the entire intellect 

 would not be too much — nay, it would not be enough. 

 It would be necessary to add to it what we find in every 

 other terminal point of evolution. And these diverse 

 and divergent elements must be considered as so many 

 extracts which are, or at least which were, in their humblest 

 form, mutually complementary. Only then might we 

 have an inkling of the real nature of the evolution move- 

 ment; and even then we should fail to grasp it completely, 

 for we should still be dealing only with the evolved, which 

 is a result, and not with evolution itself, which is the act 

 by which the result is obtained. 



Such is the philosophy of life to which we are leading 

 up. It claims to transcend both mechanism and finalism; 

 but, as we announced at the beginning, it is nearer the 

 second doctrine than the first. It will not be amiss to 

 dwell on this point, and show more precisely how far this 

 philosophy of life resembles finalism and wherein it is 

 different. 



Like radical finalism, although in a vaguer form, our 

 philosophy represents the organized world as a harmonious 

 whole. But this harmony is far from being as perfect 

 as it has been claimed to be. It admits of much discord, 

 because each species, each individual even, retains only 

 a certain impetus from the universal vital impulsion and 

 tends to use this energy in its own interest. In this con- 

 sists adaptation. The species and the individual thus 

 think only of themselves — whence arises a possible conflict 



