ii.l INTELLIGENCE AND INSTINCT 147 



of the honey, and also suppress the rival that otherwise 

 would have come out of the egg. And equally all this 

 happens as if the Sitaris itself knew that its larva would 

 know all these things. The knowledge, if knowledge there 

 be, is only implicit. It is reflected outwardly in exact 

 movements instead of being reflected inwardly in conscious- 

 ness. It is none the less true that the behavior of the insect 

 involves, or rather evolves, the idea of definite things 

 existing or being produced in definite points of space 

 and time, which the insect knows without having learned 

 them. 



Now, if we look at intelligence from the same point 

 of view, we find that it also knows certain things with- 

 out having learned them. But the knowledge in the 

 two cases is of a very different order. We must be careful 

 here not to revive again the old philosophical dispute 

 on the subject of innate ideas. So we will confine our- 

 selves to the point on which every one is agreed, to wit, 

 that the young child understands immediately things that 

 the animal will never understand, and that in this sense 

 intelligence, like instinct, is an inherited function, there- 

 fore an innate one. But this innate intelligence, although 

 it is a faculty of knowing, knows no object in particular. 

 When the new-born babe seeks for the first time its mother's 

 breast, so showing that it has knowledge (unconscious, 

 no doubt) of a thing it has never seen, we say, just because 

 the innate knowledge is in this case of a definite object, 

 that it belongs to instinct and not to intelligence. Intelli- 

 gence does not then imply the innate knowledge of any 

 object. And yet, if intelligence knows nothing by nature, 

 it has nothing innate. What, then, if it be ignorant of 

 all things, can it know? Besides things, there are relations. 

 The new-born child, so far as intelligent, knows neither 

 definite objects nor a definite property of any object; 



