168 CREATIVE EVOLUTION [chap. 



of one and the same principle, which in the one case re- 

 mains within itself, in the other steps out of itself and 

 becomes absorbed in the utilization of inert matter. This 

 gradual divergence testifies to a radical incompatibility, 

 and points to the fact that it is impossible for intelligence 

 to re-absorb instinct. That which is instinctive in instinct 

 cannot be expressed in terms of intelligence, nor, conse- 

 quently, can it be analyzed. 



A man born blind, who had lived among others born 

 blind, could not be made to believe in the possibility of 

 perceiving a distant object without first perceiving all the 

 objects in between. Yet vision performs this miracle. 

 In a certain sense the blind man is right, since vision, hav- 

 ing its origin in the stimulation of the retina, by the vi- 

 brations of the light, is nothing else, in fact, but a retinal 

 touch. Such is indeed the scientific explanation, for the 

 function of science is just to express all perceptions in 

 terms of touch. But we have shown elsewhere that the 

 philosophical explanation of perception (if it may still be 

 called an explanation) must be of another kind. 1 Now 

 instinct also is a knowledge at a distance. It has the 

 same relation to intelligence that vision has to touch. 

 Science cannot do otherwise than express it in terms of 

 intelligence; but in so doing it constructs an imitation 

 of instinct rather than penetrates within it. 



Any one can convince himself of this by studying the 

 ingenious theories of evolutionist biology. They may be 

 reduced to two types, which are often intermingled. One 

 type, following the principles of neo-Darwinism, regards 

 instinct as a sum of accidental differences preserved by 

 selection: such and such a useful behavior, naturally 

 adopted by the individual in virtue of an accidental pre- 

 disposition of the germ, has been transmitted from germ 



1 Matiere et m&noire, chap. i. 



