it.] THE IDEA OF 'NOTHING' 277 



out eternity, seems to me natural. A circle drawn with 

 chalk on a blackboard is a thing which needs explanation: 

 this entirely physical existence has not by itself where- 

 with to vanquish non-existence. But the " logical essence" 

 of the circle, that is to say, the possibility of drawing it 

 according to a certain law — in short, its definition — is a 

 thing which appears to me eternal: it has neither place 

 nor date; for nowhere, at no moment, has the drawing 

 of a circle begun to be possible. Suppose, then, that the 

 principle on which all things rest, and which all things 

 manifest possesses an existence of the same nature as that 

 of the definition of the circle, or as that of the axiom 

 A = A: the mystery of existence vanishes, for the being 

 that is at the base of everything posits itself then in eternity, 

 as logic itself does. True, it will cost us rather a heavy 

 sacrifice: if the principle of all things exists after the 

 manner of a logical axiom or of a mathematical defini- 

 tion, the things themselves must go forth from this principle 

 like the applications of an axiom or the consequences of a 

 definition, and there will no longer be place, either in the 

 things nor in their principle, for efficient causality under- 

 stood in the sense of a free choice. Such are precisely 

 the conclusions of a doctrine like that of Spinoza, or even 

 that of Leibniz, and such indeed has been their genesis. 



Now, if we could prove that the idea of the nought, 

 in the sense in which we take it when we oppose it to 

 that of existence, is a pseudo-idea, the problems that are 

 raised around it would become pseudo-problems. The 

 hypothesis of an absolute that acts freely, that in an 

 eminent sense endures, would no longer raise up intel- 

 lectual prejudices. The road would be cleared for a 

 philosophy more nearly approaching intuition, and which 

 would no longer ask the same sacrifices of common 

 sense. 



