iv.i THE IDEA OF 'NOTHING' 291 



posed to be interested exclusively in the possible that is 

 indicated, and is not concerned to know by what kind 

 of reality the possible is replaced. The expression of 

 the substitution is therefore bound to be cut short. In- 

 stead of affirming that a second term is substituted for 

 the first, the attention which was originally directed to 

 the first term will be kept fixed upon it, and upon it alone. 

 And, without going beyond the first, we shall implicitly 

 affirm that a second term replaces it in saying that the 

 first "is not." We shall thus judge a judgment instead 

 of judging a thing. We shall warn others or warn our- 

 selves of a possible error instead of supplying positive 

 information. Suppress every intention of this kind, give 

 knowledge back its exclusively scientific or philosophical 

 character, suppose in other words that reality comes itself 

 to inscribe itself on a mind that cares only for things and 

 is not interested in persons: we shall affirm that such or 

 such a thing is, we shall never affirm that a thing is not. 



How comes it, then, that affirmation and negation 

 are so persistently put on the same level and endowed 

 with an equal objectivity? How comes it that we have 

 so much difficulty in recognizing that negation is sub- 

 jective, artificially cut short, relative to the human mind 

 and still more to the social life? The reason is, no doubt, 

 that both negation and affirmation are expressed in propo- 

 sitions, and that any proposition, being formed of words, 

 which symbolize concepts, is something relative to social 

 life and to the human intellect. Whether I say "The 

 ground is damp" or "The ground is not damp," in both 

 cases the terms "ground" and "damp" are concepts more 

 or less artificially created by the mind of man — extracted, 

 by his free initiative, from the continuity of experience. 

 In both cases the concepts are represented by the same 

 conventional words. In both cases we can say indeed 



