iv.i THE IDEA OF 'NOTHING' 295 



To represent that a thing has disappeared, it is not enough 

 to perceive a contrast between the past and the present; 

 it is necessary besides to turn our back on the present, 

 to dwell on the past, and to think the contrast of the past 

 with the present in terms of the past only, without letting 

 the present appear in it. 



The idea of annihilation is therefore not a pure idea; 

 it implies that we regret the past or that we conceive it 

 as regrettable, that we have some reason to linger over 

 it. The idea arises when the phenomenon of substitition 

 is cut in two by a mind which considers only the first half, 

 because that alone interests it. Suppress all interest, 

 all feeling, and there is nothing left but the reality that 

 flows, together with the knowledge ever renewed that it 

 impresses on us of its present state. 



From annihilation to negation, which is a more general 

 operation, there is now only a step. All that is necessary 

 is to represent the contrast of what is, not only with what 

 has been, but also with all that might have been. And 

 we must express this contrast as a function of what might 

 have been, and not of what is; we must affirm the existence 

 of the actual while looking only at the possible. The 

 formula we thus obtain no longer expresses merely a 

 disappointment of the individual; it is made to correct 

 or guard against an error, which is rather supposed to be 

 the error of another. In this sense, negation has a peda- 

 gogical and social character. 



Now, once negation is formulated, it presents an aspect 

 symmetrical with that of affirmation; if affirmation affirms 

 an objective reality, it seems that negation must affirm 

 a non-reality equally objective, and, so to say, equally 

 real. In which we are both right and wrong: wrong, 

 because negation cannot be objectified, in so far as it is 

 negative; right, however, in that the negation of a thing 



