iv.) MODERN SCIENCE 329 



regard to change and duration. That modern philosophy- 

 has repeatedly, but especially in its beginnings, had the 

 wish to depart from it, seems to us unquestionable. But 

 an irresistible attraction brings the intellect back to its 

 natural movement, and the metaphysic of the moderns 

 to the general conclusions of the Greek metaphysic. We 

 must try to make this point clear, in order to show by what 

 invisible threads our mechanistic philosophy remains 

 bound to the ancient philosophy of Ideas, and how also it 

 responds to the requirements, above all practical, of our 

 understanding. 



Modern, like ancient, science proceeds according to the 

 cinematographical method. It cannot do otherwise; all 

 science is subject to this law. For it is of the essence of 

 science to handle signs, which it substitutes for the objects 

 themselves. These signs undoubtedly differ from those 

 of language by their greater precision and their higher 

 efficacy; they are none the less tied down to the general 

 condition of the sign, which is to denote a fixed aspect of 

 the reality under an arrested form. In order to think 

 movement, a constantly renewed effort of the mind is 

 necessary. Signs are made to dispense us with this effort 

 by substituting, for the moving continuity of things, an 

 artificial reconstruction which is its equivalent in practice 

 and has the advantage of being easily handled. But let 

 us leave aside the means and consider only the end. What 

 is the essential object of science? It is to enlarge our 

 influence over things. Science may be speculative in its 

 form, disinterested in its immediate ends; in other words 

 we may give it as long a credit as it wants. But, however 

 long the day of reckoning may be put off, some time or 

 other the payment must be made. It is always then, in 

 short, practical utility that science has in view. Even 



