266 EVOLUTION AND DOGMA. 



"The hypothesis of self-creation," the English 

 philosopher continues, "which practically amounts 

 to what is called Pantheism, is similarly incapable of 

 being represented in thought. Really to conceive 

 self-creation, is to conceive potential existence pass- 

 ing into actual existence by some inherent necessity; 

 which we cannot do. And even were it true that 

 potential existence is conceivable, we should still be 

 no forwarder. For whence the potential existence ? 

 This would just as much require accounting for exist- 

 ence, and just the same difficulties would meet us." 

 According to Spencer, therefore, both the pantheis- 

 tic and the atheistic hypotheses must be dismissed, as 

 utterly inadequate to explain the fact of the world's 

 actual existence. 



The third hypothesis, and the one generally re- 

 ceived, is known as the theistic hypothesis; creation 

 by an external agency. But "the idea," I am still 

 quoting Spencer, " of a Great Artificer shaping the 

 universe, somewhat after the manner in which a 

 workman shapes a piece of furniture, does not help 

 us to comprehend the real mystery ; viz., the origin 

 of the materials of which the universe consists. 

 . . . But even supposing that the genesis of the 

 universe could really be represented in thought as 

 the result of an external agency, the mystery 

 would be as great as ever, for there would still 

 arise the question : How came there to be an ex- 

 ternal agent, for we have seen that self-existence 

 is rigorously inconceivable? Thus, impossible as 

 it is to think of the actual universe as self-exist- 

 ing, we do but multiply impossibilities of thought 



