THEISM AND EVOLUTION. 305 



Only the crudest conception of derivative creation 

 would demand that the theist should necessarily, if 

 consistent, have recourse to continued creative fiats 

 to explain the multifold phenomena connected with 

 inorganic or organic Evolution. For, as already ex- 

 plained, derivation or secondary creation is not, prop- 

 erly speaking, a supernatural act. It is merely the 

 indirect action of Deity by and through natural 

 causes. The action of God in the order of nature is 

 concurrent and overruling, indeed, but is not 

 miraculous in the sense in which the word "miracu- 

 lous" is ordinarily understood. He operates by and 

 through the laws which He instituted in the be- 

 ginning, and which are still maintained by His Provi- 

 dence. Neither the doctrine of the Angel of the 

 Schools nor that of the Bishop of Hippo, requires the 

 perpetual manifestation of miraculous powers, inter- 

 ventions or catastrophes. They do not necessitate 

 the interference with, or the dispensation from, the 

 laws of nature, but admit and defend their existence 

 and their continuous and regular and natural action. 

 Only a misunderstanding of terms, only a gross mis- 

 apprehension of the meaning of the word "creation," 

 only, in fine, the " unconscious Anthropomorphisms" 

 of the Agnostic and the Monist, would lead one to 

 find anything irreconcilable between the legitimate 

 inductions of science and the certain and explicit 

 declarations of Dogma. 



himself to the same effect when he tells us, in his tractate, "De 

 Angelis," lib. I, no. 8, that we must not have recourse to the 

 First Cause when the effects observed can be explained by the 

 operations of secondary causes. " Non est ad Primam Causam 

 recurrendam cum possunt effectus ad causas secundas reduci." 



