PRIMITIVE MAN. 391 



and absurdly wrong; and of course it vitiates all their 

 conceptions of primeval man as well as of man's 

 future destiny. Further, the theistic idea implies that 

 man was, without exhausting toil, to regulate and 

 control nature, to rule over the animals, to cultivate 

 the earth, to extend himself over it and subdue it ; and 

 all this as compatible with moral innocence, and at 

 the same time with high intellectual and spiritual 

 activity. 



There is, however, a still nicer and more beautiful 

 distinction involved in this, and included in the won- 

 derful narrative in Genesis, so simple yet so much 

 more profound than our philosophies ; and which 

 crops out in the same discussion of the critics of 

 Darwin, to which I have already referred. A writer 

 in the Quarterly Review had attempted to dis- 

 tinguish human reason from the intelligence of 

 animals, as involving self-consciousness and reflec- 

 tion in our sensations and perceptions. Huxley 

 objects to this, instancing the mental action of a 

 greyhound when it sees and pursues a hare, as 

 similar to that of the gamekeeper when he lets slip 

 the hound.* 



"As it is very necessary to keep up a clear dis- 

 tinction between these two processes, let the one be 

 called neurosis and the other psychosis. When the 

 gamekeeper was first trained to his work, every step 

 in the process of neurosis was accompanied by a cor- 

 responding step in that of psychosis, or nearly so. 

 * Contemporary Review, November, 1871, p. 461. 



