202 STUDIES IN LIFE AND SENSE. 



instinctive cries, aided by signs and gestures." If one were disposed 

 to be critical in respectof this plain statement of the origin of speech, 

 such criticism might lie in the direction of assigning a higher 

 place to the " signs and gestures " of primitive man than Mr. Darwin 

 gives them. The movements of expression, as representing the most 

 patent results of certain thoughts, would contribute, I hold, quite as 

 much towards the association and stereotyping of certain sounds to 

 form language, as the cries or sounds which in themselves might be 

 held to represent the beginnings of speech. Indeed, if priority is to be 

 assigned to any of the contributing elements of language, the gesture 

 or sign may reasonably enough be regarded as the antecedent of the 

 sound. One objection to the "bow-wow" theory has been founded 

 on the observation that, were its main features true, and if the earliest 

 words were merely imitations of natural sounds, we should find 

 similar primitive concepts to represent the same objects under all 

 circumstances. But do we not frequently find such likeness? Witness 

 the word crow, its Latin corvus, Greek korone, Sanskrit kdrava, and 

 its root ru or kru, to call ; or the example cited against the " bow- 

 wow" theory by Max Miiller himself, namely, moo, the nursery name 

 for cow, Indian gu, Teutonic kuh, and Greek- Latin bon. Is not 

 " cuckoo " the exact representation of the bird's voice ? Is not the 

 "mu-mu" of the West African negro, meaning "dumb," the most 

 natural reproduction, like our own "mum," of a significant term for 

 silence, as "rap" and "tap" are obvious imitations of common 

 sounds ? Apart from the fact that such likeness as is demanded by 

 the " bow-wow " theory of language does exist, there still remains a 

 very obvious explanation of the dissimilarity which exists between 

 many primitive sounds and root-types of words. The early efforts 

 of the primitive mind did not seek a uniformity or aim at an 

 exact sameness of sound in constructing a representative word. 

 There existed at the most an attempt at a plausible imitation. As 

 the primitive sounds themselves were varied, so the mental powers 

 which received and imitated them were of diverse calibre. In 

 the beginnings of mental activity, there must have existed shades 

 and variations of receptivity, just as, in their later development, 

 mental phenomena vary with the individual and the race. So that 

 the differences existing between the primitive word-concepts may be 

 traced to natural variations in the mental skill or powers which 

 reproduce them, or to the process of phonetic decay. And thus 

 also existent likeness between word-concepts are only explicable in 

 a natural fashion, on the principle that primitive man imitated, as best 

 he could, the first sounds which presented themselves to his opening 

 ears and dawning intelligence. 



This slight incursion into the domain of the philologist may be 

 excused on the ground that it furnishes us with the main points of 



