328 IDEALISM AND COMMON SENSE 



manner of means can I gather anything more than a symbolic 

 knowledge of it. 



554. Indeed, to go yet deeper, it is a question whether I can 

 gather even a symbolic knowledge. I have surmised that my 

 feelings have been awakened by a real object, but it is impossible 

 to test that hypothesis. The symbolism of my dreams, if symbolism 

 it be, is, I am accustomed to believe, very misleading. How can I 

 know whether the symbolism of my waking hours is of a more 

 truthful kind ? My waking feelings seem to link together better 

 than my dream feelings, but the fact that they link better together 

 does not prove that they are symbols of anything. At any rate 

 this is certain, that what I term the ' properties ' of the material 

 object, extension, weight, colour, and the like, are really feelings 

 in me. Strip the material object of these properties, of these my 

 private feelings, and what remains of it ? The remainder, if 

 remainder there be, the ' matter in itself,' the nomnenon, is quite 

 inconceivable. For me it has no thinkable existence. I close my 

 eyes, and have a recollection of the sheet. That recollection is 

 not more a mental and less a material thing than the perception 

 I had when my eyes were open. 



555. It is evident that the only existence of which we are really 

 aware is a stream of feelings. That stream of feelings is the whole 

 of consciousness. For us the universe is a universe of appearances, 

 of phenomena, which we construct out of our own feelings. Time 

 and space are only modes of thought, the former being concerned 

 mainly with appearances that occur in succession, the latter with 

 appearances which co-exist. We speak of mind and matter, but 

 from first to last we know of nothing but mind. We are conscious 

 of nothing else. Matter is a metaphysical abstraction, an unknown 

 and unknowable something which has been surmised by common 

 sense, but only surmised, to be in some way the cause of phenomena. 

 But our minds are so constructed that we are impelled to attribute 

 material existence to many appearances. Thus this sheet of paper 

 appears to me a thoroughly material object. If I tear, or burn, 

 or crumple it, I seem to be wrecking a material thing with material 

 hands. It is only when I pursue a very unusual line of thought that 

 I am able to realize that I am dealing throughout with groups of feel- 

 ings which experience tells me tend to follow one another in certain 

 sequences. The sight of the paper, the intention to tear it, the 

 sight, and sound, and tactile sensations of tearing, and the feeling 

 of an intention accomplished are all equally mental phenomena. 



556. We shall see later that it is probable that animals low in 



