THE NOTION OF CAUSATION 351 



shot because he angered the other man. A knowledge of the 

 whole circle of causation would imply perfected science, a thorough 

 knowledge and understanding of the whole universe during all past 

 time. In a sense, at any instant, we can point to the termination 

 of effect, for at any instant the effect has not proceeded beyond 

 that instant; but the circle of causation had its beginnings only in 

 the beginnings, if any, of time and space. But this totality, both 

 when we consider the qualities of objects, and the circle of 

 causation, is utterly unwieldy. Therefore, as in practice we select 

 for purposes of thought certain qualities of objects, so also when 

 tracing causation we select certain parts of the circle. We 

 suppose a chain, and, even then, think only of those links that 

 appear to serve our purpose best. 



589. In this way, by supposing that objects have reality out- 

 side our minds, and by supposing that they have qualities by 

 means of which they act and react on one another in a uniform 

 way, we gather the notion of a universe which, so far from being 

 chaotic, is orderly to its minutest details ; and in reference to 

 which, as far as we are able to perceive the order and trace cause 

 and effect, we are able to use such words as, ' understand,' ' explain/ 

 1 why,' ' reason,' and the like with intelligible meanings. If we 

 did not, and more especially if we had not, supposed a material 

 universe, our thoughts, as we have seen, would be without 

 coherence. Or rather, we would have no thoughts, but only 

 feelings. Very emphatically, then, the entire notion of causation 

 belongs wholly to common sense. It has, or should have, no place 

 in idealist thinking. 



590. All science, like all ordinary thinking, is founded on 

 common sense. " Every science assumes certain data uncritically, 

 and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 

 * laws ' obtain and from which its deductions are carried on. ... 

 Of course these data are themselves discussable, but the discussion 

 of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics." x That is, 

 every science thinks in terms of what are supposed to be real 

 existences and omits to discuss the question whether they are, or 

 are not, real, " All physical science starts from certain postulates. 

 One of them is the objective existence of a real world." 2 It is true 

 that we are told that " a scientific law is related to the perceptions 

 and conceptions formed by the perceptive and reasoning faculties in 

 man ; it is meaningless except in association with these ; it is the 



1 James, Principles of Psychology, Preface, v-vi. 



2 Huxley, Essays, vol. iv., p. 60. 



