VOLUNTARY ACTIONS 375 



also does weariness. Clearly it is the presence of the desire that 

 renders the act voluntary. Every instinctive impulse is nothing 

 other than a desire, even when the object of desire is not easily re- 

 cognised. Were the desire not present we should not act. Hunger 

 inclines us to procure and chew our food ; both actions are dis- 

 tinctly voluntary. Imitativeness, curiosity, sexual, and parental 

 love, also prompt us to acts which are entirely voluntary. It is 

 true that sometimes, when the prompting desire is very strong, we 

 are colloquially said to act ' against our wills.' As a fact, however, 

 except in the case of the reflexes, we never do act against them, 

 though we often act against our judgments. Wise and good 

 actions are certainly all voluntary ; but, equally certainly, not all 

 voluntary actions are either wise or good. When the starving 

 sailor kills and eats his comrade he may abhor and struggle against 

 his desire. Nevertheless from the act of killing to the act of 

 chewing his actions are voluntary. He performs them simply 

 because his desire, his will to eat, is stronger than his will to 

 abstain. 



620. It must be borne in mind that, especially in the case of 

 beings like men whose desires are complex, two or more impulses 

 inciting to different actions may be in operation at the same time. 

 When one is distinctly stronger than the other, we yield to it at 

 once ; when they are equally balanced, we have a feeling of irre- 

 solution. Suppose a man falls in love with his friend's wife, the 

 feeling would be an instinct, and would impel to instinctive acts. 

 Opposed to it might be a desire to do right. He will certainly 

 yield to the stronger desire, and, in each case, his action will be 

 voluntary. It is very probable that before taking one course or 

 the other he will seek to reinforce his desire to do right by 

 picturing all the consequences of doing wrong. But if he acts 

 wrongly he will not be acting against all his desires, but only 

 against one of them ; not against his whole will, but only against 

 the weaker incitement of it. No one is held blameworthy for his 

 reflex actions. It is felt that he does not initiate them by his will, 

 and that even when he is able to some extent voluntarily to 

 control them, he must sooner or later yield. But for every 

 kind of instinctive act he may be held blameworthy. Therefore 

 it is recognised that they are initiated by his will. On that 

 account they involve questions of right and wrong, meriting praise 

 or blame. 



621. Apart from his reflexes, what man ever acted except 

 under the influence of desire? The anchorite abstains from 



