376 REFLEX ACTION, INSTINCT, AND REASON 



pleasure only because he desires and anticipates greater pleasure 

 in heaven. The patriot dies because his desire for his country's 

 good overmasters his desire for life. The tigress that has captured 

 prey goes hungry because her instinctive desire for food is 

 opposed by a yet stronger desire to feed her cubs. If I 

 deliberately burn myself, it is only because my desire to do so 

 is stronger than my desire to avoid pain. In every case the 

 action, whether instinctive or * rational,' is prompted by desire, 

 and, if prompted by desire (which awakens the will) is plainly 

 voluntary, plainly different from those distinctly non-voluntary 

 actions which we term reflex. Compare, for example, the actions 

 to which hunger prompts with the peristaltic action of the stomach 

 when hunger is satisfied. The former are instinctive, the latter are 

 reflex. Wherein lies the distinction ? Clearly in the circumstance 

 that the instinctive actions are prompted by desire and initiated 

 by the will, whereas the reflex actions are neither prompted by 

 the one nor initiated by the other. 



622. The term voluntary is sometimes limited to deliberate acts. 

 Thus, if I avoid a danger by taking thought, I am quite rightly 

 thought to act voluntarily. But, if I impulsively start away 

 from it, my action is held by psychologists to be involuntary or 

 even ' reflex.' But we shall see later that speed and absence of 

 deliberation imply, not necessarily lack of will, but only a quick 

 and smooth working of it, one principal condition of which is 

 absence of opposing desires. When we are hungry and have only 

 one dish, we set to work without hesitation. If half-a-dozen 

 dishes are placed before us, we may deliberate before setting to. 

 But our action in the one case is just as voluntary as in the 

 other. Will is one thing, deliberation is quite another thing. All 

 deliberate actions are certainly voluntary ; but, quite certainly, not 

 all voluntary actions are deliberate. When we are beset by two 

 or more nearly evenly balanced desires, we hesitate, reflect, 

 deliberate. But these mental processes are quite distinct from 

 will. They may incline the scale in one direction or the other 

 and so end the paralysis of will which results from balanced 

 desires. But obviously they are no part of the will, nor even a 

 necessary accompaniment of it. 



623. Voluntary action then may be defined as action which 

 is prompted by desire. An instinct, we see, is an 'innate' and 

 ' inherited ' inclination, an impulse, to act in a certain way under 

 certain conditions. At a fixed stage in his development the 

 caterpillar builds himself a cocoon. His dwelling is a wonderful 



