INTELLIGENT ACTIONS 377 



structure, but from our human point of view, the most wonderful 

 thing is that he does not learn to build it. He may never have 

 seen a cocoon before, and he constructs only one in his life. Yet 

 his work is perfect, or at least excellent, and it is as good at 

 its beginnings as at its endings. Evidently he owes nothing to 

 experience beyond the stimulus to act, but is impelled and guided 

 throughout by that ' innate and inherited ' faculty which we term 

 instinct. Since his cocoon-building instinct does not appear at 

 the beginning of conscious life, it is termed a deferred instinct. 

 He has many such, for instance the instincts of flight and mating, 

 which do not appear until after he has undergone his meta- 

 morphosis into a butterfly. 



624. On the other hand, man, unlike the caterpillar, cannot 

 build his house unless he first learns to build it. He depends, not 

 on instinct, but on stored experience. The faculty by which 

 experience is stored in the mind is termed memory. The faculty 

 by which we use stored experience is termed intelligence. When 

 the contents of memory are very vast, and the processes of thought 

 by which they are utilised comparatively difficult and complex, 

 intelligence is termed reason. INTELLIGENCE and REASON depend, 

 therefore, on MEMORY, on ability to learn, on capacity to profit by 

 stored experience. Memory is not the whole of intelligence, but 

 it is the basis of it. Without memory, there could be sensation 

 and emotion, but no thought ; for the materials for thought would 

 be lacking. Thinking depends on such processes as association, 

 comparison, discrimination, inferring, and the like, which in turn 

 depend on memory. 



625. In a sense, the caterpillar has discrimination; thus, he 

 can distinguish his food or his mate from other objects ; but he 

 has not the kind of discrimination which is so much used by man. 

 His discrimination does not depend on a comparison of present 

 things with things formerly known or imagined, but merely on 

 differences of feeling awakened by different objects. He does 

 that which he feels is pleasant, not that which he has learnt is 

 pleasant. If a man had no memory he could compare no two 

 objects or ideas. He could have no ideas. He could perceive 

 men and women who might awaken emotions and impulses in 

 him, but he would not know them for men and women, nor as 

 big or small, dark or fair, near or far, nor would he know the ends 

 of the actions to which he was impelled. Such thoughts, de- 

 pending as they do on association and comparison, could not 

 arise in his mind, which, at the end of a long life, since he had 



