325 f^g Sermons, ssajrs, anir JUbietos. [xiv. 



green ; and he would be quite as right in saying that it 

 is green, as we are in declaring it to be red. But then, 

 as the marble cannot, in itself, be both green and red, at 

 the same time, this shows that the quality "redness" 

 must be in our consciousness and not in the marble. 



In like manner, it is easy to see that the roundness and 

 the hardness are forms of our consciousness, belonging 

 to the groups which we call sensations of sight and 

 touch. If the surface of the cornea were cylindrical, we 

 should have a very different notion of a round body 

 from that which we possess now ; and if the strength of 

 the fabric, and the force of the muscles, of the body were 

 increased a hundredfold, our marble would seem to be as 

 soft as a pellet of bread crumbs. 



Not only is it obvious that all these qualities are in us, 

 but, if you will make the attempt, you will find it quite 

 impossible to conceive of " blueness," " roundness," and 

 " hardness " as existing without reference to some such 

 consciousness as our own. It may seem strange to say 

 that even the " singleness " of the marble is relative to us ; 

 but extremely simple experiments will show that such is 

 veritably the case, and that our two most trustworthy 

 senses may be made to contradict one another on this 

 very point. Hold the marble between the finger and 

 thumb, and look at it in the ordinary way. Sight and 

 touch agree that it is single. Now squint, and sight 

 tells you that there are two marbles, while touch asserts 

 that there is only one. Next, return the eyes to their 

 natural position, and, having crossed the forefinger and 

 the middle finger, put the marble between their tips. 

 Then touch will declare that there are two marbles, while 

 sight says that there is only one ; and touch claims our 

 belief, when we attend to it, just as imperatively as 

 sight does. 



But it may be said, the marble takes up a certain 



