328 f^ag Sermons, (Kssaijs, anir IJLefabfas* [xiv. 



mediate consciousness ; but which, nevertheless, are of 

 the highest practical value, inasmuch as the conclu- 

 sions logically drawn from them are always verified 

 by experience. 



This, in my judgment, is the ultimate issue of Descartes' 

 argument ; but it is proper for me to point out that we 

 have left Descartes himself some way behind us. He 

 stopped at the famous formula, " I think, therefore I am/' 

 But a little consideration will show this formula to be 

 full of snares and verbal entanglements. In the first 

 place, the "therefore" has no business there. The "I 

 am" is assumed in the " I think," which is simply another 

 way of saying "I am thinking." And, in the second 

 place, " I think " is not one simple proposition, but three 

 distinct assertions rolled into one. The first of these is, 

 " something called I exists ;" the second is, " something 

 called thought exists;" and the third is, " the thought is 

 the result of the action of the I" 



Now, it will be obvious to you, that the only one of 

 these three propositions which can stand the Cartesian 

 test of certainty is the second. It cannot be doubted, 

 for the very doubt is an existent thought. But the first 

 and third, whether true or not, may be doubted, and 

 have been doubted. For the assertor may be asked, 

 How do you know that thought is not self-existent ; or 

 that a given thought is not the effect of its antecedent 

 thought, or of some external power 1 And a diversity of 

 other questions, much more easily put than answered. 

 Descartes, determined as he was to strip off all the gar- 

 ments which the intellect weaves for itself, forgot this 

 gossamer shirt of the "self;" to the great detriment. 

 and indeed ruin, of his toilet when he began to clothe 

 himself again. 



But it is beside my purpose to dwell upon the minor 

 peculiarities of the Cartesian philosophy. All I wish to 



