THE PERCEPTION OF SIGHT. 271 



of certainty, accuracy, and precision, for us to be able to main- 

 tain so artificial a balance as is necessary for walking on stilts 

 or for skating, for the singer to know how to strike a note with 

 his voice, or the violin-player with his finger, so exactly that its 

 vibration shall not be out by a hundredth part. 



Moreover, it is clearly possible, by using these sensible 

 images of memory instead of words, to produce the same kind 

 of combination which, when expressed in words, would be 

 called a proposition or a conclusion. For example, I may know 

 that a certain person with whose face I am familiar has a pecu- 

 liar voice, of which I have an equally lively recollection. I 

 should be able with the utmost certainty to recognise his face 

 and his voice among a thousand, and each would recall the other. 

 But I cannot express this fact in words, unless I am able to add 

 some other characters of the person in question which can be 

 better defined. Then I should be able to resort to a syllogism 

 and say, 'This voice which I now hear belongs to the man 

 whom I saw then and there.' But universal, as well as 

 particular conclusions, may be expressed in terms of sensible 

 impressions, instead of words. To prove this I need only refer 

 to the effect of works of art. The statue of a god would not 

 be capable of conveying a notion of a definite character and 

 disposition, if I did not know that the form of face and the ex- 

 pression it wears have usually or constantly a certain definite 

 signification. And, to keep in the domain of the perceptions 

 of the senses, if I know that a particular way of looking, for 

 which I have learnt how to employ exactly the right kind of 

 innervation, is necessary in order to bring into direct vision a 

 point two feet off and so many feet to the right, this also is a 

 universal proposition which applies to every case in which I 

 have fixed a given point at that distance before, or may do so 

 hereafter. It is a piece of knowledge which cannot be expressed 

 in words, but is the result which sums up my previous success- 

 ful expeiience. It may at any moment become the major 

 premiss of a syllogism, whenever, in fact, I fix a point in the 

 supposed position and feel that I do so by looking as that major 

 proposition states. This perception of what I am doing is my 



