ORGANIC EVOLUTION — MENTAL 139 



to ends, just as much as a man who runs to secure a 

 snared bird, or who builds a " golden bridge " for a 

 flying enemy ? I think that Professor Komanes would 

 have designated the actions of the spider as instinctive, 

 and the actions of the man as rational. Yet, in 

 what respect do they differ ? Only in that the actions 

 of the spider result from knowledge which is inborn 

 and inherited, whereas the actions of the man result 

 from knowledge which is neither inborn nor transmis- 

 sible, but has been acquired. Again, in what particular 

 does the action of the young alligator, that seeks the 

 water and snaps at an opposing walking-stick, differ 

 from the actions of the man who seeks a refuge and 

 strikes at an intervening enemy ? Only, I think, in 

 that the one acts by virtue of inborn transmitted know- 

 ledge, whereas the other acts by virtue of acquired, 

 non-transmissible knowledge. If we take the words 

 " exercised in adaption to circumstances, novel alike to 

 the experience of the individual and to that of the 

 species," as separating that Avhich is instinctive from 

 that which is rational, by what term shall we designate 

 the action of a man who speaks, or even of one who 

 builds a hut, actions novel neither to the experience of 

 the individual nor to that of the species ? Wherein do 

 such actions differ from those of a bird, which utters 

 cries of rage or fear or warning, or which builds a nest ? 

 Once again, only, in that the man acts by virtue of 

 acquired, non-inherited knowledge, whereas the bird 

 acts by virtue of knowledge which is inborn and 

 inherited. 



In very low animals, such as the coelenterates, almost 

 all actions are apparently reflex. Higher in the scale 

 reflex action becomes manifestly associated with instinct. 

 Higher yet, reflex action and instinct become associated 

 with reason. But though reflex action and instinct suc- 

 cessively lose their positions of commanding importance 



