A DEISTICAL FRIEND. 203 



to these verbal controversies, but seeing that my uncles, 

 though well-grounded in the doctrines of Christianity, 

 were ill-qualified to answer every objection raised 

 against it by a veteran quibbler, out of a desire of 

 assisting them, I set myself to examine the different 

 bearings of the doctrines they defended. Predestin- 

 ation first engaged me. I read all that is said of 

 it in Scripture, drew conclusions from the prescience 

 of God, and from Plato's Dialogues of Socrates, and 

 some other philosophic writers, and endeavoured to pro- 

 duce data from whence to show that predestination is 

 not a doctrine peculiar to revealed religion. I had long 

 looked upon controversial divinity as the worst kind of 

 nonsense ; and since my argumentative conversation with 

 my cousin G. had entertained an antipathy against verbal 

 controversy of every kind ; this, added to a hesitating 

 manner of speech, and a consciousness of an inability to 

 preserve my ideas from becoming confused when I waxed 

 warm on any subject, after all my preparation, withheld 

 me from attacking my brother deist. 



' Had any one told me at that time that I was in 

 reality brother in belief to a deist, I would have com- 

 plained of injustice. In fact, my opinions were so waver- 

 ing that, with a due regard to truth, I could not tell 

 what I did or did not believe. I saw there were two 

 schools of deism, the high and the low. Epicurus of 

 the ancient philosophers and Hume of the modern, men 

 who, while they remained sceptical on the subject of 

 future rewards and punishments, and of the Providence 

 of God, cherished virtue for its own sake, both by 

 example and precept, I regarded as members of the first : 

 while I looked upon the brood of half-bred wits, who, 

 with Paine at their head, battled with religion because 

 it gave a deeper and stronger sanction to the laws of 



