CH. II.] FORESEEINGS— EXPECTATIONS. 61 



ceptive force], and is accompanied by its own proper material 

 ideas, of which we know nothing, and of which we can trace no 

 action in the rest of the economy. Granted, however, that a 

 certain continuance of the conceptions is necessary to the 

 recollections of the memory, it follows that the material ideas 

 of these continuous conceptions must continue also in the 

 brain (26), and this is the view usually taken of the conceptions 

 of the memory. But a conception may continue in the mind 

 for a century, and be never remembered, until a new con- 

 ception is formed to the effect that it is the same as that 

 which formerly existed. 



72. Sensational memory induces by its recollections those 

 material ideas in the brain, which have something in common 

 with the antecedent material sensations (71, 66), and, in so far 

 as they can excite animal actions, their actions will accord 

 in some degree with those of the antecedent sensations or 

 imaginations. 



Foreseeings. — Expectations. 



73. The sensational foreseeings and expectations arise from 

 true present external sensations and the renewal of former sen- 

 sations {Imaginations, 67), which have an element in common 

 with each other; if the mind considers that, wherein they 

 differ as something to come, it foresees; or the same as that 

 which is actually coming, it expects. (Baumgarten, §§ 444, 454.) 

 They are more remotely dependent on external sensations than 

 are imaginations, because they depend on the latter, which them- 

 selves are directly derived from external sensations (66) . Purely 

 sensational expectations are termed forebodings [Ahndungen] 

 (Baumgarten, § 454). Foreseeings, expectations, and fore- 

 bodings are consequently conceptions of future external sensa- 

 tions, which have also their proper sub-impressions [merkmale] 

 on the brain. Consequently the material ideas, also of all 

 these foreseeings, must be those of future external sensations, 

 but still very imperfect ones, since the mind can develope them 

 spontaneously, only so far as is possible, without the direct aid 

 of external impressions on the nerves (35, 36) ; that is to say, 

 when the mind developes foreseeings, movements arise in the 

 brain, which are the imperfect material ideas of future external 

 sensations. Since foreseeings are weaker than external sensa- 



