54 CEREBRAL FORCES. [i. 



in their nature, and exciting different material sensations at 

 the origin of the nerve which feels. The pleasure or suf- 

 fering which the proper sensational conceptions (66) excite, 

 is termed sensational pleasure, or sensational suffering; and 

 under this term pleasure or pain of the senses is often in- 

 cluded. The more sensational the spontaneous conceptions 

 are in their character, the more their agreeableness or disagree- 

 ableness is in accordance with the sensual pleasure or pain of 

 the external sensations from which they are derived, or to which 

 they are related ; and when they excite actions in the economy, 

 the latter are similar to those of the external sensations. We 

 can know and understand from the external impressions of 

 the sensations, which either directly or proximately excite these 

 sensational conceptions, why the conceptions ensue ; they ensue, 

 also, according to the same laws (66). On the contrary, pleasure 

 or suffering of the intellectual conceptions is developed accord- 

 ing to purely psychological laws, and has no manifest relation 

 to the external impressions of external sensations, which excite 

 them quite remotely. From an unpardonable confusion of 

 ideas, even modern physicians have taught, that the sensational 

 kinds of pleasure and pain have their seat in the body, those of 

 the intellect in the mind. They have also fallen into the same 

 error as to the passions, of which more afterwards (579, iii). 



Desires, Aversions. 



81. When the mind foresees anything pleasing to it, or 

 (what amounts to the same thing) the conception of anything 

 pleasing, it exerts its conceptive force, it endeavours to bring 

 this foreseen agreeable conception forward, to make it pre- 

 sent, or to accomplish its fulfilment, that is to say, to feel it 

 (in the third sense of the word, § 34, note) ; and to develope 

 the contrary conception to a foreseen unpleasant conception 

 (to feel it, to accomplish its fulfilment), in so far as in either case 

 it expects to be able to effect these objects by the exertion of 

 its forces. This effort, this straining of its conceptive force, 

 which it makes with the intention of realizing a foreseen 

 external or internal sensation (34, 80), is termed, in the first 

 case, desire, in the second, aversion. When the foreseen 

 agreeable conception (or thing), or the opposite to a disagree- 



