120 ANIMAL-SENTIENT FORCES. [i. 



seeings (73), desires, aversions, passions nay, more remotely, by 

 those of ideas of the understanding, and of intellectual desires 

 and aversions of the will. All these actions, which are either 

 only coincident with those of imaginations, or are only incidently 

 connected with them, must be carefully distinguished from 

 those proceeding directly from imaginations. Yesterday a 

 person ran ; at night he dreams that he is running, and begins 

 to breathe quickly. This is the sentient action of his imagi- 

 nation. Then he thinks he is falling and calls out; this is 

 the sentient action of his foreseeing. He seeks to place him- 

 self upright, and strains his muscles to that end ; this is the 

 sentient action of a desire (223, 224) . 



236. As sometimes in dreaming, and especially in somnam- 

 bulism and insanity, the imaginations are so vivid, that they 

 equal true external sensations, so also, in such cases, they de- 

 velope the same sentient actions in the mechanical machines, 

 as if they really proceeded from the latter (70, 69) . 



237. When the mind is in reverie [dichtet], it combines the 

 constituents of various imaginations with each other, and then 

 each develops its actions in the mechanical machines, according 

 to the laws of imaginations. In a prolonged reverie [dichten], 

 which consists of the most vivid imaginations and imperfect 

 external sensations, as, for example, in somnambulism, insanity, 

 or delirium, the sentient actions are as distinct as if they resulted 

 from real external sensations (236), only they are not so per- 

 fect, complete, and regular, and are not so accordant with the 

 natural functions of the body (184), so that there arises danger 

 to its health and conservation. The principles laid down as to 

 imaginations (231 — 236) are also applicable to reveries of the 

 imagination [Erdictungen] . 



238. The remembrance of a conception (71) does not appear 

 to be a species of conception, which develops actions externally 

 to the brain, except so far as the conception which is remem- 

 bered is an external sensation or imagination that so acts. A 

 person sees a visionary figure, and becomes pale with fear. It 

 is the resemblance of an individual who long ago caused him 

 bitter vexation. The pallor comes on before it is remembered 

 whom the figure resembles, and simply from the repeated ex- 

 ternal sensation, without the recognition. How often in such 

 cases we hear persons say : " this appearance terrifies, affects. 



