CH. III.] ACTIONS OF FORESEEINGS. 123 



swimming, and when he had laboured diligently, he seized 

 the bed-clothes with one hand, thinking it was the child, while 

 with the other he attempted to swim to the imaginary shore. 

 Then he laid his burden down, shivered with cold, his teeth 

 chattering, as if he had come out of an ice-cold river. He 

 said that he was stiff with cold, and asked for a glass of 

 brandy. The dreamer had not really felt the ice-cold river, 

 nor had repressed perspiration irritated the nerves of the 

 muscles. The whole mental action of his foreseeing of both, 

 manifested itself only by shivering and chattering of the teeth. 

 In this case, the foreseeing develops the subordinate sentient 

 action of the future external sensation only, omitting the 

 primary, because the mind thought principally, in its foreseeing, 

 of the subordinate external sensation, — the irritation of the 

 muscles, — and did not combine with it the foreseeing the 

 antecedent primary sensation in the cutaneous nerves (241). 



243, The cause why the sentient actions of foreseeings are 

 more imperfect and more feeble than those of external sen- 

 sations, is the want of the external impression (239, 240). 

 Still, very strong sensational foreseeings may cause imperfect 

 external sensations, which resemble the external impression 

 (74, 148) ; and foreseeings, accompanied by their imperfect 

 external sensations, may develope such perfect sentient actions 

 in the mechanical machines, that they are generally similar to 

 the sentient actions of true external sensations (150, 240). 

 Thus, a person who dreams vividly that he hears it thundering, 

 may start so violently in the bed as to shake it. Thus, also, 

 an infant in the cradle sucks the air with all its might, from 

 the foreseeing that it is sucking the breast. 



244, i. An impression can excite no foreseeing if not felt, 

 for it is, of course, not imagined (233, i) ; consequently its 

 nerve-action, purely as such, is never at the same time the 

 sentient action of a foreseeing, until it is the sentient action 

 of its sensation (239, 184, i.) On the other hand, the mind 

 can feel and imagine (223), and, consequently, foresee such a 

 nerve-action (73), and these foreseeings can excite sentient 

 actions in the mechanical machines. 



ii. The external impressions often excite by its own vis 

 nervosa (7) those movements which are sentient actions of the 

 external sensation, in which case they are nerve actions (183). 



