124 ANIMAL-SENTIENT FORCES. [i. 



Now, as the external impression is wanting in the sentient 

 actions of foreseeings (228, 229), the co-operation of its vis 

 nervosa is wanting, and, consequently, the movements dependent 

 upon it do not enter into the sentient actions of foreseeings, 

 or, at least, are not excited by it, but occur only incidentally. 

 If, therefore, a foreseeing repeats the sub-impressions «, b, c, 

 of a preceding external sensation, with which certain movements 

 in the mechanical machines are connected, but which are not 

 sentient actions of the external sensations a, h, c, but simply 

 nerve-actions of the co-operating external impression, — these 

 actions do not occur, if the impression itself be not made. 



245, i. The sentient actions of foreseeings, as well as those 

 of external sensations (192) and imaginations (234, i), take 

 place in all those mechanical machines which can be moved by 

 external sensations and imaginations, and excite the same move- 

 ments as the latter, but more feebly and imperfectly (193). 

 Nay, even the foreseeings connected with imperfect external 

 sensations, excite the mechanical machines to the same move- 

 ments as are excited by true external sensations (240, 243). 



ii. The foreseeings of agreeable or disagreeable sensations 

 contain, in some degree, the impressions of pleasure or pain 

 (186), and develope such actions as are in accordance with, or 

 opposed to, their normal function (195, 197, 198). 



iii. As external sensations do not excite to movement all 

 those mechanical machines which the nerves can move (201, 

 239), so is it also with regard to foreseeings. 



iv. As external sensations, when they produce actions in 

 the mechanical machines, act upon them according to their 

 respective capabilities, so is it also with regard to foreseeings, 

 so that the principles laid down previously under this head 

 (204 — 217) are also applicable to the latter. 



246. There are often connected with the sentient actions of 

 foreseeings certain others of an incidental kind, as, for instance, 

 those of desires, aversions, and even more remotely, those of 

 understanding and efforts of the will (65), and in addition 

 to the sentient actions of co-existing true external sensations, 

 imaginations, and other foreseeings. All these actions, whether 

 co-existent, or incidentally connected with those of foreseeings, 

 must be distinguished from the latter. The foreseeing of a 

 lascivious action acts directly on the organs which have to per- 



