160 ANIMAL-SENTIENT FORCES. [i. 



their sentient actions arise from external impressions, trans- 

 mitted to the brain (266, 269; 281 — 290). Although they 

 appear to be actions meditated on, and willed for a special 

 object, they occur without any other aim than those that relate 

 to the external sensation of satisfaction of the instinct, there 

 being no knowledge of the inducements or incitants, — of the 

 ulterior objects of the instinct, — or of the intention of nature. 

 It would be most erroneous to infer, that the skilfully adapted 

 actions of animal instincts are the operations of a sensational 

 uaderstanding or wisdom, and the result of thought. The 

 animal is not only ignorant of the inducements of its instincts, 

 but they act in spite of it. The obscure sensational stimuli 

 of the instinct spring from these inducements, also without the 

 knowledge or preference of the animal, and without its being 

 able to reason regarding them (264, 270). From these stimuli 

 the instinct results, according to the eternal laws of the con- 

 ceptive force (81, 94), naturally and necessarily, since no 

 animal can prevent itself desiring or avoiding sensationally 

 that which has once become unavoidably pleasant or unpleasant 

 (80, 81). This effort of the mind is forcibly directed to 

 the attainment of the satisfaction of the instinct without a 

 knowledge of the means, or, at least, of their use (266) ; nature 

 provides them for the animal, and brings them so near to it, 

 that it cannot avoid them; consequently it cannot suppress 

 the instinct, or avoid its gratification, by means of the reason 

 or the will, as man, in many instances, is able to do. Lastly, 

 the animal enjoys the pleasing external sensation accompanying 

 the gratification of the instinct blindly and quietly, without a 

 knowledge of its ulterior objects, and without troubling itself 

 in the least about them (266). Now, since all this applies to 

 the sensational instincts, it is equally applicable to their 

 voluntary movements (283, 284), and consequently it is also a 

 mistake to consider these as the result of reason and reflection. 

 293. But this is not all; for it can be proved, that these 

 various instinctive actions are, under varying circumstances, 

 only nerve-actions (183, 269), and can take place without any 

 external sensations or conceptions whatever, as will be demon- 

 strated in the Second Part of this work (see § 561), and that 

 it is consequently an error to conclude, that the apparent 

 care of animals for themselves and their young, the wise 



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