180 ANIMAL-SENTIENT FORCES. [i. 



nerves, are termed free-will movements [freywillige Bewe- 

 gungen]. 



Note. — The free will [freywillige] movements are almost 

 always confounded with the sensational voluntary movements 

 [willkiihrlichen] . Volition [Willkiihr] may be either sensa- 

 tional or intellectual. Free-will movements are sentient actions 

 of the intellectual, and not of the sensational will [Willkiihr] . 

 Consequently, there is an infinite number of volitional [will- 

 kiirliche] movements (the sensational), which are not free-will 

 movements.^ 



336. In the sensational desires and aversions, especially in 

 the instincts, neither their sensational stimuli, nor their grati- 

 fication, is within the powers of the mind (292). It is 

 otherwise with the intellectual desires and aversions. As the 

 mind can choose for itself the favorable side of a thing, or 

 decide in what way it shall consider it, it can cause it either 

 to be pleasing, and therefore desires it; or, contrarily, dis- 

 pleasing, and therefore abhors it. And since the mind chooses 

 such conceptions for the objects of desire and aversion as it 

 has the full power to develop, as, for example, the direction 

 of the muscles to voluntary movements (283), it satisfies its 

 desires as soon as they are excited ; and if these conceptions 

 produce sentient actions (free-will movements), the latter 

 result the moment they are desired. This is the reason why 

 the free-will movements, as well as all volitional movements 

 generally (283), follow so implicitly the thoughts, so that the 

 simple pleasure of the mind is sufficient for their production. 

 A comparison of this power of volition (Willkiihrlichkeit) of 

 the will with the natural impulse of the sensational desires, 

 instincts, and passions, explains why the former, taken alone, 

 has entirely moral relations : the latter, either no moral rela- 

 tions whatever, or only in a subordinate degree (297) . 



337. When sensational stimuli cause intellectual motives, 

 and both refer to one and the same object, or vice versa, 

 and with both it is either agreeable or unpleasant, the will 



1 In an early work on Human Physiology, and which contains the germ of many 

 ideas more fully developed in this, Unzer distinguishes (as in this place) between 

 sensational and intellectual will, and characterises the movements resulting there- 

 from respectively as willkuhrlich and freiwilUg. (Philosoph. Betrachtung des 

 Menschlichen Korpers iiberhaupt. Halle, 1750.) See also note to § 283. — Ed. 



