290 ANIMAL FORCES. [ii. 



conceptions and their sentient actions must be traced as far as 

 the outbreak of the passion and its sentient actions, so that it 

 may be noted how they are developed from each other, according 

 to psychological laws (108). 



565. Amongst those sensational conceptions induced by an 

 external sensation, and which must be generally developed ere 

 they form the passions (94), there are in many passions some 

 which are incidental and as little related to the primary sensa- 

 tion, as conceptions of the understanding; and, consequently, 

 are not really produced by the external impression which 

 excites the sensation, but are excited in successive series, accord- 

 ing to psychological laws. But since these conceptions are 

 nevertheless the incitements [Triebfedern] of the passion which 

 they excite into activity, it follows that the sentient actions of 

 the passion so excited are not really produced by the primary 

 material sensation, and, consequently, not by its external im- 

 pression; and therefore cannot be developed either as its 

 sentient action or nerve-action. An example will illustrate 

 this. An individual sees another who resembles a deceased 

 friend. This constitutes the primary external sensation of all 

 that follows. In accordance with psychological laws the mind 

 perceives the resemblance, and this is the first intermediate 

 conception which is not connected with the sensation according 

 to the laws of the vis nervosa. Thence arises the imagination 

 of the deceased friend, which has only, in common with the 

 sensation, those sub-impressions of the two persons in which 

 they are alike. Next arises the recollection of the death of the 

 friend, and all its accompanying circumstances, with which the 

 primary sensation has nothing in common. Lastly, the fore- 

 seeing arises, that death has cut off all possibility of future 

 converse with him. This foreseeing is painful, and the mind 

 endeavours, according to psychological laws, to develop the 

 conception antagonistic to this painful one. In the effort of 

 the conceptive force to effect this, consists the passion of sorrow, 

 which was excited by the sight of the individual. All the 

 conceptions thus excited are as far removed from the primary 

 sensation, as many an abstract conception induced by sensations, 

 consequently, the sensation has really contributed nothing to 

 the sentient actions of the sorrow. But the vis nervosa of the 

 external impression of the sensation can only develop as nerve- 



