CH.ii.] PRINCIPAL GENERA OF EXISTING ANIMALS. 323 



iv. But it is further objected : — all these animals appear to 

 be moved and excited by external sensations, and to act voli- 

 tionally, rationally, and designedly. Ants like sugar, bees 

 Hke the juice of certain plants, and each species of insects and 

 worms has its peculiar food, which they seek, avoiding others. 

 They are guided by certain sounds, as when they are allured 

 by sexual intercourse (in the case of crickets), or when bees 

 would swarm ; they fly away when they see any thing unex- 

 pectedly; they smell the odour of their food, and go towards it. 

 In these actions, an effort to satisfy an instinct is shown, which 

 is directed volitionally, and an animal that so acts must be sen- 

 tient. The argument has much plausibility; it has, however, 

 been demonstrated already, that external impressions will excite 

 voUtional acts simply as nerve-actions, whether the animal feels 

 them or not, and independently of any reference to the gratifi- 

 cation of any desire or instinct (263 — 269, 552, 561). The 

 phenomena manifested by newly-born and decapitated animals, 

 some of which have been already stated (555, &c.), amply prove 

 that such apparently volitional acts may take place, under cir- 

 cumstances which altogether exclude the idea of mind. What 

 in them appears to be volitional, only appears so, because we 

 draw conclusions as to other animals from the nature and work- 

 ing of our own minds (436 — 439) . What appears to be designed, 

 arises from the preordination of nature, and in no case enters 

 into the minds of even sentient animals (266, 609) . 



V. But it is further objected, — that these animals act de- 

 signedly and volitionally, without the incitement of external 

 impressions, and consequently they must be under the influence 

 of conceptions. The answer is, that the movements alluded to 

 result from primary internal impressions not caused by con- 

 ceptions (609), and it would be indeed difficult to show, that 

 these animals had such, independently of external impressions. 

 (Compare § 553.) 



vi. It is further objected, that many of these animals, as 

 bees, ants, &c., act socially and in combination, for the purpose 

 of attaining certain objects. They assist each other in their 

 labours, get out of each other^s way, take each other's burdens, 

 appear to apprize each other of danger, combat their common 

 enemies, &c. This is really the most weighty argument that 

 can be advanced in support of the doctrine, that these animals 



