CH. IV.] ANIMAL LIFE. 331 



animal nature implies the existence of the sensational animal 



nature, and is consequently compounded of these two — the 



intellectual and sensational. But inasmuch as sensational life 



;an continue independently of the intellectual (620), it follows 



lat a reasoning animal may lose its intelleccual life, and yet 



>ntinue to be a sensational animal : — it may die mentally, and 



ive sensationally, or merely animally. So long as the higher 



limal-sentient forces continue in action in the slightest degree, 



lental life continues. As this life depends on the intimate 



lion of the soul and body, when this union is broken, that is 



say, when reason and will are abolished, mental life ceases, 



mt sensational life may still go on (620). 



642. All these differences in the liie of animals exist in 

 lature (638 — 641) ; but their nomenclature does not accord 



with the terms in ordinary use, so that their specific designa- 

 tion enables us to analyse our ideas more correctly. Ordinarily, 

 sensational life and intellectual life (made up of the sensational 

 and natural) are both designated by the term proper animal 

 life, or the life of an animal (Baumgarten^s 'Metaphysics/ 

 §§ 575, 576), which can only be understood to mean, the actual 

 continuance of the union of soul and body. This idea is too 

 narrow, and is founded on the erroneous notion, that every 

 animal is endowed with a soul, and consequently excludes the 

 idea of mere animal life (639) ; but since insentient animals 

 may exist, the definition must include these, and thus various 

 errors will be avoided : as for example, that decapitated animals 

 still possess souls, or that the soul is extended throughout the 

 body, or that a sentient animal must have several souls, or that 

 all animal movements are sentient actions, &c. 



643. If, therefore, the usual phraseology be adopted, sentient 

 animals alone (640 — 642) possess proper animal life, and there 

 remains a special class of animals, intermediate creatures pos- 

 sessed of mere animal life solely (639). We would designate 

 the aggregate in sentient animals of the two kinds, namely, 

 of the proper animal life and the mere animal life — complete 

 [ganze] animal life, or the continuance of their complete animal 

 nature (598). We should not, consequently, infer that an animal 

 had lost its complete animal life, because its proper animal life 

 — the connection of body and soul — had ceased ; nor that no 

 sentient actions could take place in it; otherwise we should 



