220 ON THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERS OF 



and it remains also for me to offer examples from among Ihe more curious 01 

 striking instances of each of these recondite powers, both under a more simple 

 and a more complicated modification. This shall form the basis of our ensuing 

 study. At present 1 shall only farther observe that instinct may be defined 

 the operation of the principle of organized life by the exercise of certain na- 

 tural powers directed to the present or future good of the individual ; and rea- 

 son the operation of the principle of intellectual life, by the exercise of certain 

 acquired powers directed to the same end. Both equally answer their object, 

 are equally perfect in their kind, and equally display their common origin. 



Whether with Reason or with Instinct blest, 

 Thus all enjoy the power which suits them best ; 

 To bliss alike by that direction tend, 

 And find the means proportioned to their end. 

 Say, where full Instinct is th' unerring guide, 

 What Pope or Council can they need beside ? 

 Reason, however able, cool at best, 

 Cares not for service, or but serves when press'd ; 

 Stays till we call, and then not often near; 

 But honest Insiinct comes a volunteer : 

 Sure never to o'ershoot, but just to hit. 

 While still too wide or short is human wit; 

 Sure, by quick nature, happiness to gain, 

 Which heavier Reason labours at in vain. 

 This, too, serves always, Reason never long, 

 One must go right, the other may go wrong ; 

 See then the acting and comparing powers, 

 One in their nature, which are two in ours ; 

 And Reason raise o'er Instinct as you can, 

 In this 't is God directs, in that 't is man. POPE. 



LECTURE V. 



ON THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERS OF INSTINCT, SENSATION, AND INTELLIGENCE. 



WE closed our last study by observing that instinct is the operation of 

 the principle of organized life by the exercise of certain natural powers 

 directed to the present or future good of the individual, while reason is the 

 operation of the principle of intellectual life by the exercise of certain ac- 

 quired powers directed to the same end. Hence reason demands discipline 

 and attains maturity ; instinct, on the contrary, neither demands the one nor 

 is capable of attaining the other; it is disciplined and mature from the first, 

 and is as perfect in the infant as in the man. 



Instinct, however, has as often been confounded with FEELING or SENSATION 

 as it has with PERCEPTION, which is the outline or foundation of reason: and 

 hence another source of those perplexities and errors in distinguishing be- 

 tween animal and vegetable life which we noticed in the preceding lecture: 

 perplexities and errors which have been productive of the most absurd and 

 disgusting consequences, and especially in regard to the delicate and elegant 

 science of botany. 



Instinct, sensation, and perception are all principles essentially different; 

 they may, indeed, exist conjointly, but each of them is capable of existing 

 separately. Instinct is the common law or property of organized matter, as 

 gravitation is of unorganized ; and the former bears the same analogy to sen- 

 sation and perception as the latter does to crystallization and chemical affi- 

 nity. Instinct is the general faculty of the organized mass, as gravitation is 

 of the unorganized mass; sensation and perception are peculiar powers or 

 faculties appertaining to the first, as crystallization and affinity are apper 

 taming to the second : they can only exist under certain circumstances of the 

 organized or unorganized matter to which they respectively belong. 



This parallel, indeed, may be carried much farther. Gravitation discovers 

 itself under different modifications, different degrees of power, and, conse- 



