ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. 853 



But the mind, as we have already observed, has various powers or faculties 

 as well as the body ; and they are quite as active and lively in their respective 

 functions. In consequence of which the ideas of external objects are not 

 only perceived, but retained, thought of, compared, compounded, abstracted, 

 doubted, believed, desired ; and hence another fountain, and of a very capa- 

 cious flow, from which we also derive ideas, namely, a reflex act or percep- 

 tion of the mind's own operations ; whence the ideas derived from this foun- 

 tain are denominated ideas of REFLECTION. 



The ideas, then, derived from these two sources, and which have some- 

 times been called OBJECTIVE, and SUBJECTIVE,* constitute all our experience, 

 and consequently all our knowledge. Whatever stock of information a man 

 may be possessed of, however richly he may be stored with taste, learning, or 

 science, if he turn his attention inwards, and diligently examine his own 

 thoughts, he will find that he has not a single idea in his mind but what has 

 been derived from the one or the other of these two channels. But let not 

 this important observation be forgotten by any one ; that the ideas the mind 

 possesses will be fewer or more numerous, simpler or more diversified, clear 

 or confused, according to the number of the objects or subjects presented to 

 it, and the extent of its reflection arid examination. Thus, a clock or a land- 

 scape may be for ever before our eyes, but unless we direct our attention to 

 them, and study their different parts, although we cannot be deceived in their 

 being a clock or a landscape, we can have but a very confused idea of their 

 character and composition. The ideas presented to the mind, from which of 

 these two sources soever derived, or, in other words, whether objective or 

 subjective, are of two kinds, SIMPLE and COMPLEX. 



SIMPLE IDEAS consist of such as are limited to a single notion or perception ; 

 as those of unity, darkness, light, sound, hardness, sweetness, simple pain, or 

 uneasiness. And in the reception of these the mind is passive, for it can 

 neither make them to itself, nor can it, in any instance, have any idea which 

 does not wholly consist of them ; or, in other words, it cannot contemplate 

 any one of them otherwise than in its totality. Thus, on looking at this 

 single sheet of paper, I have the idea of unity; and though I may divide the 

 single sheet of paper into twenty parts, I cannot divide the idea of unity into 

 twenty parts ; for the idea of unity will and must as wholly accompany every 

 part as it accompanies the collective sheet. And the same remark will apply 

 to all the rest. 



COMPLEX IDEAS are formed out of various simple ideas associated together, 

 or contemplated derivatively. And to this class belong the ideas of an army, 

 a battle, a triangle, gratitude, veneration, gold, silver, an apple, an orange: 

 in the formation of all which it must be obvious that the mind is active, for it 

 is the activity of the mind alone that produces the complexity out of such 

 ideas as are simple. And that the ideas I have now referred to are complex, 

 must be plain to every one ; for every one must be sensible that the mind 

 cannot form to itself the idea of an orange without uniting into one aggre- 



fate the simple ideas of roundness, yellowness, juiciness, and sweetness, 

 n like manner, in contemplating the idea of gold, there must necessarily be 

 present to the mind, and in a complex or aggregate form, the ideas of great 

 weight, solidity, yellowness, lustre : and if the idea be very accurate, great 

 malleability and fusibility. 



Complex ideas are formed out of simple ideas by many operations of the 

 mind ; the principal of which, however, are some combination of them, some 

 abstraction, or some comparison. Let us take a view of each of these : 



* " On appelle, dans la philosophic AHemnnde, idees subjectives celles que naissent de la nature de notre 

 melli{ienc et de ses facultes, et idees objectives toutes cellee que sont exciiees par les sensations." Mad. 

 e Stafil Holslein, de I'Allemagne, toui. iii. p. 76. 



Mad. de SiaSI, however, has fallen into the common error of the French philosophers, from whom she 

 appears to have generally informed herself of the principles of Locke's system, in supposing that he de- 

 rived all ideas from sensation. " A 1'epoque ou parut la. Critique de la Raison pure, il n'existoit qne deux 

 systeine.s snr 1'entendement humnin parrni les penseurs ; 1'une, celui de Locke, attribuoit toutes nos idles d 

 nos sensations ; I'autre, celui de Des Cartes et de Leibnitz, s'attachoit a demontrer la spirituality et 1'acti- 

 vit6 de I'dme, de libre aibitre, enfin toute la doctrine idealist*." Jb. p. 70. 



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