ON HUA1A& HAPPINESS. 391 



Both questions are important : the first, however, may be settled in a few 

 words. To discover the will of an intelligent agent, nothing more is necessary 

 than to examine the general drift or tendency of his contrivance, so far as we 

 are able to make it out. Taking it, then, for granted, that the world is the 

 work of an intelligent agent, does it exhibit proof of having been devised 

 for the general accommodation and happiness of man ? for his general misery, 

 or for neither 1 ? It cannot have been devised for neither, because that 

 would be to relinquish the very foundation of our present position, and to 

 deny that the world exhibits contrivance, or has been formed by an intelligent 

 agent ? Is, then, the world, with its general furniture, is the frame of man 

 itself calculated to promote man's happiness or his misery ? It is impossible 

 to answer this question more strongly than in the words of Archdeacon 

 Paley : 



" Contrivance proves design, and the predominant tendency of the con- 

 trivance indicates the disposition of the designer. The world abounds with 

 contrivances ; and all the contrivances with which we are acquainted are 

 directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists : but is never, that we 

 can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to 

 ache : their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps 

 inseparable from it; or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the con- 

 trivance ; but it is not the object of it. This is a distinction which well de- 

 serves to be attended to. In describing implements of husbandry, you would 

 hardly say of the sickle that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though, 

 from the construction of the instrument, and the manner of using it, this mis- 

 chief often happens. But if you had occasion to describe instruments of 

 torture or execution, this engine, you would say, is to extend the sinews ; 

 this to dislocate the joints ; this to break the bones ; this to scorch the soles 

 of the feet. Here pain and misery are the very objects of the contrivance. 

 Now, nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never 

 discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anato- 

 mist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and 

 disease ; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, This is to 

 irritate ; this to inflame ; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys ; this 

 gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout. If, by chance, he come 

 at a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is that it is use- 

 less. No one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to 

 torment. Since, then, God has called forth his consummate wisdom to con- 

 trive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been con- 

 stituted with this design at first, so long as this constitution is upholden by 

 him, we must, in reason, suppose the same design to continue."* 



A thousand other examples might be added, but it is unnecessary. The 

 conclusion is clear, and it is most important: we obtain from the light of nature, 

 or the exercise of our own reason, irresistible proofs of the divine benevo- 

 lence, irresistible proofs that God has made man to make him happy: or, in 

 other words, that human happiness is the will of God. 



We are now, then, prepared to enter upon our last question : Is a course 

 of virtue the path to happiness, for if it be, it must necessarily be the will of 

 God to walk in it? Or, having proved the terms to be co-ordinate,- we may 

 propose the question conversely, Is a course of virtue the will of God ? For 

 if it be, it must necessarily conduct to human happiness. Under either view 

 of the question, the general proposition will be as follows: God has willed 

 human happiness, and he has willed it to be obtained by a course of virtue. 

 God, then, is the Author, happiness the end, and virtue' the means. 



Let us take the question before us in its first view, Is human virtue the 

 means of human happiness ? 



Had we time it might perhaps be expedient to enter into a definition of the 

 terms : but we have not time, and I must refer, therefore, to the general un- 

 derstanding of mankind upon this subject: which I may do the more safely, 



Mor. and Pol. Phil. vol. i. ch. . 



